Monetizing Edge Service in Mobile Internet Ecosystem by Wang, Zhiyuan et al.
1Monetizing Edge Service in Mobile Internet
Ecosystem
Zhiyuan Wang, Lin Gao, Tong Wang, and Jingjing Luo
Abstract—In mobile Internet ecosystem, Mobile Users (MUs) purchase wireless data services from Internet Service Provider (ISP) to
access to Internet and acquire the interested content services (e.g., online game) from Content Provider (CP). The popularity of
intelligent functions (e.g., AI and 3D modeling) increases the computation-intensity of the content services, leading to a growing
computation pressure for the MUs’ resource-limited devices. To this end, edge computing service is emerging as a promising approach
to alleviate the MUs’ computation pressure while keeping their quality-of-service, via offloading some computation tasks of MUs to
edge (computing) servers deployed at the local network edge. Thus, Edge Service Provider (ESP), who deploys the edge servers and
offers the edge computing service, becomes an upcoming new stakeholder in the ecosystem. In this work, we study the economic
interactions of MUs, ISP, CP, and ESP in the new ecosystem with edge computing service, where MUs can acquire the
computation-intensive content services (offered by CP) and offload some computation tasks, together with the necessary raw input
data, to edge servers (deployed by ESP) through ISP. We first study the MU’s Joint Content Acquisition and Task Offloading (J-CATO)
problem, which aims to maximize his long-term payoff. We derive the off-line solution with crucial insights, based on which we design
an online strategy with provable performance. Then, we study the ESP’s edge service monetization problem. We propose a pricing
policy that can achieve a constant fraction of the ex post optimal revenue with an extra constant loss for the ESP. Numerical results
show that the edge computing service can stimulate the MUs’ content acquisition and improve the payoffs of MUs, ISP, and CP.
Index Terms—Internet ecosystem, game theory, edge computing monetization, business model.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Motivation
MOBILE Internet has been increasingly indispensablefor Mobile Users (MUs) in the past decades. Each MU
typically signs a long-term contract with the Internet Ser-
vice Provider (ISP) to obtain the wireless data service. The
contract offered by ISP usually corresponds to a monthly
data plan, consisting of a monthly data cap, a lump-sum
subscription fee, and a per-unit fee for exceeding the data
cap [1]. Accordingly, MUs, with the wireless data service,
can acquire and enjoy various Internet content services
(e.g., online game and video streaming) through the mobile
applications of Content Providers (CPs) on their mobile de-
vices [2]. There are two major trends in the mobile Internet
ecosystem during the past several years.
• The content service (offered by CPs) has been increas-
ingly data-hungry due to the popularity of the high-
resolution videos, cloud-based services, and various
social media.
• The content service (offered by CPs) has been in-
creasingly computation-intensive due to the intelligent
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functions (e.g., virtual reality, mobile games, and 3D
modeling) within the CP’s mobile application.
Regarding the increasing data volume, previous studies
(e.g., [3], [4]) have shown that ISP can alleviate the growing
mobile Internet data traffic through more innovative wire-
less data services. The study on the increasing computation
volume, however, is still at the early stage. On one hand,
the intelligent content service can help CPs attract more
MUs. On the other hand, the growing computation volume
may degrade the MU’s Quality of Experience (QoE), as the
mobile devices are usually resource-limited. Mobile edge
computing, allowing MUs to offload some computing tasks
to the edge servers, is becoming the potential solution to
the growing computation volume [5]. There have been some
initial trials carried out by different third-party Edge Service
Providers (ESPs). For example, Vapor IO has opened two
edge server sites in Chicago. EdgeMicro has built a fully
functional edge server in Englewood.
The edge service furnishes MUs with both opportunities
and challenges. The crucial part is the trade-off between
the local execution and the edge execution. Specifically,
the choice of edge-execution helps MUs reduce the local-
execution cost, but edge-execution is not free of charge.
First, the edge-execution of computation tasks requires that
the MU should offload the necessary raw input data (e.g.,
the images in AR functions) to the edge servers, which
potentially increases the wireless data usage. Second, the
self-interest ESP also wants to monetize the edge service.
In general, the above trade-off will affect the QoE of MUs,
leading to different content acquisition behaviors. Therefore,
this motivates us to study the following key question:
Question 1. What is the MU’s optimal content acquisition and
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2task offloading strategy?
As an upcoming stakeholder in the ecosystem, ESP (e.g.,
Vapor IO and EdgeMicro in US market) is self-interest and
seek for more economic benefit from operating the edge
servers. However, comparing to the wireless data service
(offered by ISP), the MUs’ demand on the edge service is
more random and unpredictable. On the one hand, the local-
execution capabilities are heterogeneous across the MU pop-
ulation, depending on the computation resource (e.g., the
CPU frequency) of their mobile devices. On the other hand,
the MU’s demand on the edge server is usually time-variant,
affected by their acquired content service and the operating
state of the mobile device (e.g., the battery volume). All
these issues will significantly affect how heavily the MU
relies on the edge servers in practice. These observations
motivate us to investigate the following key question:
Question 2. How should ESP monetize the edge service?
Besides the aforementioned strategic behaviors of MUs
and ESP, it is crucial to unveil the economic effect of the up-
coming edge service on the classic mobile Internet value
chain with MUs (as the consumers) as well as ISP and
CP (as the providers). First of all, the edge service may
imperceptible increase the MUs’ wireless data usage, as the
edge-execution relies on offloading the necessary raw input
data. Hence the ISP offering the wireless data service is
possible to benefit from the edge service of ESP. Further-
more, the edge service provides a new solution for the MUs
to acquire the computation-intensive content service, which
potentially increases the content acquisitions of MUs. All the
above conjectures highly depend on the strategic interplay
between the MUs and ESP. This motivates us to study the
third key question in this work:
Question 3. How will ESP’s edge service monetization affect the
ISP, CP, MUs, and the social welfare of the ecosystem?
This paper studies the new mobile Internet ecosystem
with edge computing service. We aim to demonstrate the
economic effect of the edge service and stimulate the edge
service monetization.
1.2 Main Results and Key Contributions
We investigate the mobile Internet ecosystem consisting
of MUs, CPs, ISP, and ESP. The MUs acquire and enjoy
the CPs’ content services (e.g., online game) through the
wireless data service offered by ISP and the edge computing
service offered by ESP. We take into account a multi-period
operation horizon. Each MU will make the joint content
acquisition and task offloading decisions in each time slot
(e.g., every day) with the purpose of monthly payoff max-
imization. Hence the MU’s Joint Content Acquisition and
Task Offloading (J-CATO) problem is an online payoff max-
imization. Moreover, ESP monetizes edge computing service
though an appropriate pricing policy.
The main results and key contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows:
• A Business Model Study on Mobile Internet Ecosystem:
We study the economic interactions in mobile Internet
ecosystem consisting of MUs, CPs, ISP, and ESP. Specif-
ically, we aim to unveil the economic impact of the edge
computing service. Our study is an initial step towards
understanding a more complex business model.
• A Joint Analysis of the MU’s Content Acquisition and Task
Offloading: We study the MU’s Joint Content Acquisi-
tion and Task Offloading (J-CATO) problem from the
simplified off-line version to the practical online con-
text. We first solve the off-line J-CATO (which is non-
convex) in closed-form through appropriate reformu-
lations. Our analysis unveils the significant role of the
shadow price of the wireless data usage. Moreover, we
propose an online strategy with provable performance
based on the intuition behind the shadow price.
• ESP’s Edge Service Monetization: We design a pricing
policy for ESP to monetize the edge computing service
without relying on any statistical information of the MU
population (which is costly to measure). The key idea
of the pricing policy is to iteratively explore and exploit
good pricing choices. Moreover, we show that our
pricing policy can achieve at least a constant fraction
of the ex post optimal revenue with an extra constant loss.
By appropriately tuning the parameters, it can achieve
a constant competitive ratio under mild conditions.
• Performance Evaluation and Insights: We carry out exten-
sive evaluations on the mobile Internet ecosystem with
ESP monetizing edge service. We find that the edge
service not only helps the MUs overcome the local-
computing bottleneck, but also stimulates the content
acquisitions of MUs. Meanwhile, both ISP and CP also
benefit from the increasing content acquisitions. There-
fore, the edge service leads to higher social benefit for
the mobile Internet ecosystem.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews
related literatures. Section 3 introduces the system model.
Section 4 presents the MU’s off-line solution together with
key insights. Section 5 studies the MU’s online strategy.
Section 6 investigates ESP’s pricing policy. Section 7 presents
the numerical results. We conclude this paper in Section 8.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
This paper is related to two streams of studies, i.e.,
Internet ecosystem and edge computing. In the following,
we review the two streams of studies, respectively.
2.1 Internet ecosystem
The Internet ecosystem has been widely studied before
(see, e.g., [1], [2] for two comprehensive surveys). The early
studies on the Internet ecosystem mainly focused on the
Internet data service offered by ISP. The major research
problems include pricing under the peering and transit
relations (e.g., [6]), the network neutrality and regulations
(e.g., [7]), and the revenue sharing mechanisms (e.g., [8], [9]).
Some follow-up research works took into account the eco-
nomic interactions between ISPs and users under different
business models of the Internet data service. For example,
Hande et al. in [10] investigated how the ISP sells the
broadband Internet access to users under the flat-rate and
the usage-based schemes. Ma in [11] studied the congestion-
prone market and how users’ congestion sensitivity affect
the optimal price and ISPs’ competition. However, the
3above studies merely took into account the one-period static
setting, neglecting the multi-period dynamics. Some other
studies (e.g., [12], [13]) explored the dynamic game-theoretic
interactions between ISPs and users. There were also some
studies taking into account both the Internet data service
(offered by ISPs) and the Internet content service (offered by
CPs). For example, Wu et al. [14] studied the revenue sharing
and rate allocation problems between the content ISP and
the eyeball ISP (who offer Internet data service to CPs and
users, respectively). Wong et al. in [15] studied how the CPs
subsidize the users’ cost on the Internet data services and
showed that multiple stakeholders can benefit.
2.2 Edge Computing
There are many excellent studies on edge computing
from the perspective of communication (e.g., [16]) and edge
intelligence (e.g., [17]). Next we review some typical litera-
tures among the most recent ones.
Many studies on edge computing focused on the energy-
efficient offloading (e.g., [18], [19], [20]), joint communica-
tion and computation resource allocation (e.g., [21], [22],
[23]), wireless-powered system (e.g., [24], [25], [26]), and
edge caching (e.g., [27], [28], [29]). For example, You et al
in [18] studied the resource allocation for a multi-user MEC
system under time-division multiple access (TDMA) and
orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA),
aiming to minimize the weighted sum of mobile energy
consumption under the constraint on computation latency.
Mao et al in [21] developed an online joint radio and
computational resource management algorithm. They lever-
aged the Lyapunove optimization method to minimize the
long-term energy consumption and keep the task buffer
stability. Wang et al in [25] considered a wireless powered
multiuser MEC system, where a multi-antenna access point
(AP) broadcasts wireless power to charge users and each
user relies on the harvested energy to execute computation
tasks. Poularakis et al in [27] studied the joint optimization
of service placement and request routing in dense MEC net-
works with multidimensional constraints. They proposed an
algorithm that achieves close-to-optimal performance using
a randomized rounding technique.
The economic aspect of the edge service was overlooked.
There are only few studies on the business aspect of the
edge service. Specifically, Chen et al. in [30] investigated the
multiple users’ task offloading game and derived the Nash
equilibrium. Liu et al. in [31] studied how the ESP sets the
price for the finite edge computation resource to maximize
its revenue. Xiong et al. in [32] jointly considered the in-
terplay between the CPs’ sponsoring and the ESP’s edge
caching services as a hierarchical three-stage Stackelberg
game. Nevertheless, the above studies did not characterize
the users’ content consumption behavior and neglected the
multi-period dynamics.
This paper differs from the above studies in terms of
both problem setup and the theoretical solution. First, we
focus on the economic interaction between MUs and ESP,
and unveil the win-win impact of edge computing service.
Second, our proposed online MU policy addresses the non-
separable payoff, which is different from the Lyapunov
framework (as in [21], [24]). Third, we also propose a dy-
namic pricing policy for ESP, which continuously explores
and exploits good pricing outcome with provable discretiza-
tion error.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the mobile Internet ecosystem with a set
N = {1, 2, ..., N} of Mobile Users (MUs), Content Providers
(CPs), Internet Service Provider (ISP), and Edge Service
Provider (ESP). More specifically, each MU n ∈ N ac-
quires and enjoys the content service of CPs (e.g., Tencent,
Facebook, Pokemon Go, etc) on the corresponding mobile
applications. Successful content service acquisition for each
MU corresponds to the wireless content delivery (e.g., video
streaming) and the computation task execution (e.g., image
processing), which highly rely on ISP’s wireless data service
and ESP’s edge computing service, respectively.
• Wireless Content Delivery: The MU n ∈ N can obtain the
wireless data service from the ISP based on the monthly
data plans.
• Computation Task Execution: The MU n ∈ N can fulfill
the computation tasks either locally at the mobile de-
vice or remotely utilizing the edge servers of ESP.
We will consider a one-month operation period, consist-
ing of a set T = {1, 2, ..., T} of time slots. Each time slot
t ∈ T may correspond to one day or one hour. Our analysis
in this paper still holds when we consider multiple months.
Next we start with the service model for the mobile Internet
ecosystem in Section 3.1. We then characterize the MUs and
service providers in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3, respectively.
Table 1 summarizes the key notations in this paper.
3.1 Service Models
There are three types of services in the mobile Internet
ecosystem, i.e., the Internet content service, the wireless data
service, and the edge computing service. Next we introduce
the service models.
3.1.1 Wireless Data Service
Internet Service Provider (ISP) offers wireless data ser-
vice based on the monthly data plan, which is a three-
part tariff denoted by {Q,Π, pi}. Specifically, the MU pays
a monthly subscription fee Π for the data usage up to the
data cap Q. And the MU pays the overage fee pi for unit
data usage exceeding the data cap. Note that the monthly
data capQ and the monthly subscription Π of different MUs
may be different, but the overage fee pi is usually the same
for the same ISP [1].
3.1.2 Edge Computing Service
Edge Service Provider (ESP) monetizes edge computing
service by allowing MUs to offload their computation tasks
to the nearby edge servers. We suppose that ESP charges
the MUs based on the offloaded computation volume in a
dynamic usage-based manner That is, ESP can dynamically
determine the price of unit computation volume (measured
in CPU cycles) depending on the cost and the capacity.
Hence we let pt denote the unit price in slot t. Accordingly,
p = (pt : t ∈ T ) is the price vector determined by ESP.
43.1.3 Internet Content Service
We characterize the content service (offered by CPs)
based on a random vector (d, r, c), which jointly captures
the per-slot requirement on both communication and com-
putation. The detailed elaborations are as follows:
• The random variable d, defined on the support [0, d¯]
indicates the data-usage level of the content service.
Specifically, d represents the total wireless data usage
(including down-link and up-link) of acquiring CPs’
Internet content for an entire time slot.
• The random variables r and c jointly characterize the
computation requirement of acquiring content service
for one time slot. Specifically, the random variable
r with the support [0, r¯] represents the one-slot raw
data amount (e.g., raw images). The random variable c
with the support [0, c¯] represents the one-slot computing
amount (e.g., motion detection) measured in CPU cycles.
Based on the above content service model, acquiring the
content service for x fraction of time slot will correspond
to the content delivery xd (in bit) and the computation task
(xr, xc). Specifically, xr (in bit) and xc (in CPU cycles) rep-
resent the input raw data amount and computing amount,
respectively. Moreover, the computation task (xr, xc) can be
executed at the mobile devices or at the edge servers (of
ESP), which will be introduced later.
3.2 MU Model
Next we introduce the MU model. Specifically, we start
with the demand realization, MU characteristics, and the
MU’s decision in Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.2.3, respectively.
We then formulate the MU’s monthly payoff in Section 3.2.4.
3.2.1 MU Demand Realization
Based on the content service model in Section 3.1.3, we
let (dn, rn, cn) denote the content service realization of MU
n ∈ N . The vector dn = {dn,t : t ∈ T } is the data-usage
realization, the vector rn = {rn,t : t ∈ T } is the input raw
data realization, and the vector cn = {cn,t : t ∈ T } is the
computing amount realization.
3.2.2 MU Characteristics
We characterize each MU n ∈ N taking into account his
satisfaction and dissatisfaction from the content services.
First, the MUs get satisfaction (or happiness) from en-
joying the content services. We let Un,t(x) denote MU n’s
experienced satisfaction of acquiring the content service for
x fraction of the t-th slot. The utility function Un,t(·) is both
user-dependent and time-dependent, capturing the hetero-
geneous MU population and the time-variant preference,
respectively. We suppose that Un,t(·) takes the form of
Un,t(x) , θn,t · un,t(x), (1)
where θn,t is a scalar and represents MU n’s valuation (on
the content service) in slot t. Moreover, un,t(·) is increasing
and concave. We refer to un,t(·) as the normalized utility
function of MU n in slot t.
Second, the MUs also get dissatisfaction (or unhappi-
ness) from the content service due to the resource-limited
mobile devices. We let En,t(s) denote MU n’s experienced
dissatisfaction for locally executing the computation tasks
of amount s (in CPU cycles) in slot t.1 It models the
computation-intensive functions (e.g., image processing of
AR applications) against with the resource-limited mobile
devices. We suppose that En,t(·) takes the form of
En,t(s) , βn,t · en,t(s), (2)
where βn,t is a scalar and measures the sensitivity of MU
n in slot t. Moreover, en,t(·) is assumed to be increasing
and convex, capturing the limited computation capacity. We
refer to en,t(·) as the normalized cost function of MU n in
slot t.
Note that the MU’s satisfaction and dissatisfaction de-
pend on his decisions, which will be introduced next.
3.2.3 MU Decisions
Each MU n ∈ N has two sets of decisions, i.e., the
content-acquiring decisions xn and task-offloading decisions yn.
• We let xn,t ∈ [0, 1] denote the content acquiring de-
cision of MU n in slot t. Specifically, xn,t represents
the period length (i.e., fraction of slot) that MU n
spends on the content service in slot t. That is, the
content acquiring decision xn,t leads to content delivery
amount xn,tdn,t, input raw data amount xn,trn,t, and
computing amount xn,tcn,t. Accordingly, we denote
xn = (xn,t ∈ [0, 1] : t ∈ T ) as the content acquiring
decisions of MU n.
• We let yn,t ∈ [0, 1] denote the task-offloading decision
of MU n in slot t. Specifically, yn,t represents the frac-
tion of computation task to be executed remotely at the
nearby edge servers. That is, the MU tends to execute
the computation task xn,tcn,tyn,t at the edge servers
by offloading the raw data xn,trn,tyn,t. Accordingly,
we denote yn = (yn,t ∈ [0, 1] : t ∈ T ) as the task-
offloading decisions of MU n.
MU’s content-acquiring decisions x and task-offloading
decisions y will affect his wireless data usage (regarding
ISP) and the edge server usage (regarding ESP), which
eventually determine his monthly payoff.
3.2.4 MU Payoff
Now we derive the MU n’s payoff based on the decisions
(xn,yn) and the content service realization (dn, rn, cn).
Overall, MU’s payoff is defined as the difference between
the utility and the total cost. Moreover, the total cost consists
of the sunk cost and the opportunistic cost.
Utility: The MU’s utility corresponds to his satisfaction
from the content service. Hence the content-acquiring de-
cision xn will generate the monthly utility
∑T
t=1 Un,t(xn,t)
for MU n. Moreover, the content-acquiring decision xn,t (in
slot t) also leads to the wireless data usage dn,txn,t and the
computing task amount cn,txn,t, both of which will incur
cost for MU n in slot t.
Sunk Cost: MU’s sunk cost comes from executing the
computation task cn,txn,t. It includes the local-execution cost
and the edge-execution cost.
1. The dissatisfaction in MU’s payoff captures the cost of executing
the tasks locally, thus it is positively related to the computation amount.
Overall, it can capture the energy consumption in an indirect way
compared to the previous study on edge computing (e.g., [21], [22]).
5• The local-execution cost corresponds to the dissatisfac-
tion, defined in (2), due to the resource-limited mobile
device. Recall that the computation task of volume
cn,txn,t(1 − yn,t) will be executed locally, thus incurs
dissatisfaction for MU n in slot t.
• The edge-execution cost is the monetary payment (to
ESP) for utilizing the edge servers. Mathematically, the
payment is proportional to the volume of offloaded
computation task based on the unit price pt. Recall
that the computation task of volume cn,txn,tyn,t will
be executed at the edge servers, thus incurs monetary
payment for MU n in slot t.
Therefore, the decision (xn,t, yn,t) in slot t leads to the
local-execution cost En,t (cn,txn,t(1− yn,t)) and the edge-
execution cost ptcn,txn,tyn,t for MU n. For notation simplic-
ity, we define the virtual payoff of MU n in slot t as follows:
fn,t(xn,t, yn,t) ,
Un,t(xn,t)− En,t
(
cn,txn,t(1− yn,t)
)− ptcn,txn,tyn,t. (3)
Note that the three terms in the virtual payoff all correspond
to the monetary meansurement.
Opportunistic Cost: The opportunistic cost is the MU’s
monetary payment (to ISP) for the wireless data usage
exceeding the monthly data cap. The MU’s total data usage
consists of content delivery and raw data migration.
• The data usage of content delivery merely depends on
the MU’s content-acquiring decision. Specifically, the
content-acquiring decision xn,t in slot t leads to the
wireless data usage dn,txn,t.
• The data usage of raw data migration depends on the
acquiring and offloading choices. Specifically, the de-
cisions (xn,t, yn,t) lead to the raw data of volume
rn,txn,tyn,t to be migrated in slot t.
Therefore, the MU’s wireless data usage under the deci-
sion (xn,t, yn,t) in slot t is given by
hn,t(xn,t, yn,t) , dn,txn,t + rn,txn,tyn,t. (4)
Based on the above discussions on utility and costs, we
express the monthly payoff of MU n ∈ N as follows:
S(xn,yn) ,
T∑
t=1
fn,t(xn,t, yn,t)
− pi
[
T∑
t=1
hn,t(xn,t, yn,t)−Qn
]+
−Πn,
(5)
whereQn and Πn are the monthly data cap and the monthly
subscription fee of MU n, respectively. Moreover. pi is the
per-unit fee for data usage exceeding the monthly data cap.
Each MU n ∈ N will (selfishly) maximize his monthly
payoff S(xn,yn). In practice, however, each MU n ∈ N has
to determine (xn,t, yn,t) sequentially in each slot t without
knowing the future information. Therefore, the MU’s payoff
maximization is an online Joint Content Acquisition and
Task Offloading (J-CATO) problem. We will study the off-
line problem in Section 4 and investigate the online problem
in Section 5.
3.3 Revenues of Providers
Next we introduce the revenue of each service provider
(i.e., ESP, ISP, and CPs) based on the MU formulation.
TABLE 1: Key Notations.
Symbols Physical Meaning
MU
dn,t The data-usage volume for MU n in slot t
cn,t The computation volume for MU n in slot t
rn,t The raw data volume for MU n in slot t
θn,t MU n’s content valuation in slot t
βn,t MU n’s cost sensitivity in slot t
xn,t Content-acquiring decision of MU n in slot t
yn,t Task-offloading decision of MU n in slot t
zn,t The execution decision of MU n in slot t
Un,t(·) Satisfaction of MU n in slot t, defined in (1)
En,t(·) Dissatisfaction of MU n in slot t, defined in (2)
fn,t(·) Virtual payoff of MU n in slot t, defined in (3)
hn,t(·) Data usage of MU n in slot t, defined in (4)
Sn(·) Monthly payoff of MU n, defined in (5)
ISP
Q The data cap offered by ISP
Π The subscription fee charged by ISP
pi The per-unit fee charged by ISP
VISP(·) The total revenue of ISP, defined in (7)
ESP
pt The price of edge service in slot t
VESP(·) The total revenue of ESP, defined in (6)
3.3.1 ESP Revenue
Edge Service Provider (ESP) profits from the edge com-
puting service and determines the unit price pt of uti-
lizing the edge servers in each slot t ∈ T . We denote
p = (pt : t ∈ T ) as the ESP’s pricing for the edge
service. Accordingly, given all the MUs’ content-acquiring
decisions X = (xn : n ∈ N ) and task-offloading decisions
Y = (yn : n ∈ N ), the total revenue of ESP is given by
VESP(p,X,Y) ,
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
ptcn,txn,tyn,t, (6)
where xn,t and yn,t are MU n’s decisions in slot t, and
depend on the pricing decisions of ESP.
3.3.2 ISP Revenue
Internet Service Provider (ISP) profits from the wireless
data service based on the three-part tariff data plans. Specif-
ically, ISP’s revenue consists of the monthly subscription fee
and the overage fee for exceeding the monthly data cap.
Given all the MUs’ content-acquiring decisions X = (xn :
n ∈ N ) and task-offloading decisions Y = (yn : n ∈ N ),
the monthly revenue of ISP is given by
VISP(X,Y) ,
N∑
n=1
(
Πn + pi
[
T∑
t=1
hn,t(xn,t, yn,t)−Qn
]+)
,
(7)
where Qn and Πn represent the monthly data cap and
the monthly subscription fee of MU n, respectively. In
particular, we note that MUs’ decisions (X,Y) depend on
how ESP prices the edge service, i.e., p. That is, ESP’s
pricing decisions may also affect ISP’s revenue, which will
be demonstrated in Section 7.3.
3.3.3 CP Revenue
Content Provider (CP) profits from displaying advertise-
ments when the MUs are using the mobile applications
[15]. Intuitively, the longer time period the MUs spend
on the mobile applications, the more advertisements can
6be displayed. Therefore, the revenue of CP is positively
related to the total time period that the MUs spend on the
content service, i.e., the content-acquiring decisions X of
MUs. Accordingly, we model the total revenue of CPs as
follows:
VCP(X) , v
(
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
xn,t
)
, (8)
where v(·) represents a general revenue function, and is
assumed to be increasing and concave as in previous lit-
eratures (e.g., [15]). Recall that the MUs’ acquiring decisions
X depends on ESP’s pricing p. This means that ESP’s pricing
decision will affect the revenue of CPs as well. We will
demonstrate this in Section 7.
So far we have introduced the system model. Next we
start with analyzing the MU’s off-line problem in Section
4, and study the MU’s online strategy in Section 5 (based
on the off-line insights). We then investigate how the ESP
monetizes the edge service Section 6.
4 MU DECISION PROBLEM: OFF-LINE ANALYSIS
AND INSIGHTS
This section focuses on the MU’s off-line payoff maxi-
mization problem to unveil the key insights. In particular,
our analysis focuses on a generic MU, thus will neglect the
MU index n unless there is confusion.
4.1 Problem Reformulation
Suppose that the MU knows all the future information
in advance, then the off-line Joint Content Acquisition and
Task Offloading (J-CATO) problem is given by
Problem 1 (Off-Line J-CATO).
{x∗,y∗} = arg max
x,y
S(x,y) (9a)
s.t. xt ∈ [0, 1], ∀t ∈ T , (9b)
yt ∈ [0, 1], ∀t ∈ T . (9c)
Problem 1 exhibits two difficulties. First, the product
term between variables xt and yt is non-convex. Second, the
overage payment is piece-wise linear. Next we reformulate
Problem 1 in the following two steps.
First, we introduce a set of new variables z = (zt ∈
[0, 1] : t ∈ T ) to eliminate the product terms. That is, we
use zt to replace xtyt for any t ∈ T in the MU monthly
payoff, defined in (5). To ensure equivalence, we introduce
the following conditions:
0 ≤ zt ≤ xt, ∀t ∈ T . (10)
For presentation convenience, we will refer to z as the
MU’s executing decision. Accordingly, we express the MU’s
virtual payoff ft(·) defined in (3) and the wireless data usage
ht(·) defined in (4) as follows:
f˜t(xt, zt) , Ut(xt)− Et
(
(xt − zt)ct
)− ptztct, (11a)
h˜t(xt, zt) , dtxt + rtzt. (11b)
Second, we introduce a new variable s ∈ R to linearize
the piece-wise linear term in the MU’s monthly payoff,
defined in (5). Mathematically, the new variable s represents
the data usage exceeding the monthly data cap. For equiva-
lence, we should ensure the following two conditions
s ≥ 0, (12a)
s ≥
T∑
t=1
h˜t(xt, zt)−Q. (12b)
Based on the above reformulations, now we are able to
express the MU’s monthly payoff as follows:
S˜(x, z, s) ,
T∑
t=1
f˜(xt, zt)− pis, (13)
and the reformulated off-line J-CATO problem is given by
Problem 2 (Reformulated Off-Line J-CATO).
{x∗, z∗, s∗} = arg max
x,z,s
S˜(x, z, s) (14a)
s.t. (10), (12) (14b)
xt ∈ [0, 1], ∀t ∈ T , (14c)
zt ∈ [0, 1], ∀t ∈ T . (14d)
Note that after the above reformulation, Problem 2 is a
convex optimization with differentiable objective and con-
straints. We can solve it by analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions of Problem 2. Furthermore, we
have
y∗t =
{
0, if x∗t = 0,
z∗t /x
∗
t , if x
∗
t > 0,
∀t ∈ T . (15)
4.2 Solution of Problem 2
Next we solve Problem 2 based on the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions (as Problem 2 is convex). Instead
of directly presenting the mathematical solution, we will
step-by-step elaborate the key insights of the KKT analysis.
These insights are crucially valuable to our online strategy
in Section 5.
4.2.1 Shadow Price
Problem 2 is a constrained optimization problem. As we
will see later, the constraint (12b) plays a significant role in
the KKT analysis. Hence we let λ denote the Lagrangian
multiplier associated with constraint (12b). According to
the constrained optimization in economics [33], λ can be
interpreted as the shadow price of the wireless data service.
We first present a basic property related to the shadow price
λ in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The shadow price λ∗ satisfying the KKT condi-
tions of Problem 2 is no larger than pi, i.e., 0 ≤ λ∗ ≤ pi.
Proposition 1 shows a feasible range of the optimal
shadow price satisfying the KKT conditions of Problem 2.
The feasible range mainly results from the three-part tariff
wireless data service {Q,Π, pi}. Specifically, the shadow
price of the wireless data usage is zero if the MU’s monthly
data cap Q is sufficient comparing to the MU’s total data
usage. However, the shadow price is the same as the per-
unit overage fee pi if the MU’s total data usage exceeds
the monthly data cap Q. In addition, the shadow price
locates between the interval (0, pi) if the MU’s total data
usage exactly equals to the monthly data cap Q. We will
introduce how to compute the optimal shadow price λ∗ in
Section 4.2.3. Before that, we first demonstrate the primal-
dual solution structure in Section 4.2.2.
74.2.2 Solution Structure
We elaborate the mathematical structure of the optimal
primal-dual solution (x∗, z∗, λ∗) of four different cases in
Lemmas 1∼4, respectively. The four cases are characterized
based on the MU’s time-dependent features, i.e., (βt, θt).
Recall that θt is the scalar in (1) and indicates MU’s val-
uation on the content service. The larger θt value means
that MU has a greater demand on the content service in
slot t. In addition, βt is the scalar in (2) and measures MU’s
sensitivity to the local execution. The larger βt value means
that MU is less tolerant to Quality of Experience (QoE)
reduction, thus prefers to the choice of edge-execution. Next
we present the results for the four cases in Lemmas 1∼4.
Lemma 1. The optimal primal-dual solution (x∗, z∗, λ∗) satis-
fies (x∗t , z
∗
t ) = (1, 0), for the case of (βt, θt) ∈ ΩIt(λ∗), where
the set ΩIt(·) is defined as follows:
ΩIt(λ) ,
{
(β, θ) : θ >
βcte
′
t(ct)+dtλ
u′t(1)
, β < ptct+rtλcte′t(ct)
}
, (16)
where u′t(·) and e′t(·) represent the derivative of the normalized
utility and cost functions, respectively. Moreover, (dt, rt, ct) is
the content service realization in slot t.
Lemma 1 presents the optimal primal-dual solution
structure for the case of (βt, θt) ∈ ΩIt(λ∗). We elaborate this
lemma in the following two aspects.
• First, ΩIt(λ), defined in (16), is a set in terms of the
MU’s characteristics (β, θ). It is time-dependent as it
is defined based on the MU’s satisfaction ut(·) and
dissatisfaction et(·) as well as the MU’s content service
realization (dt, rt, ct). Moreover, the set ΩIt(λ) depends
on the shadow price λ as well. Hence the shadow price
λ also affects whether the MU’s characteristic (βt, θt)
belongs to the set ΩIt(λ) in slot t.
• Second, the case of (βt, θt) ∈ ΩIt(λ∗) in Lemma 1
implies that the characteristic (βt, θt) corresponds to
a weak-sensitivity and high-valuation state, denoted by
the gray region in Fig. 1. In this case, the MU is “self-
sufficient” in terms of the computation capacity. That
is, the MU is able to acquire the content service for the
entire slot (i.e., x∗t = 1) under the pure local execution
mode (i.e., z∗t = 0).
Lemma 2. The optimal primal-dual solution (x∗, z∗, λ∗) satis-
fies (x∗t , z
∗
t ) =
(
1, zIIt (λ
∗)
)
for the case of (βt, θt) ∈ ΩIIt (λ∗).
Speicfically, zIIt (·) is given by
zIIt (λ) , 1− e′−1t
(
ptct+rtλ
βtct
)/
ct, (17)
where e′−1t (·) represents the inverse function of et(·). Moerover,
the set ΩIIt (·) is given by
ΩIIt (λ) ,
{
(β, θ) : θ > ptct+(dt+rt)λu′t(1)
, β ≥ ptct+rtλcte′t(ct)
}
. (18)
Lemma 2 presents the optimal primal-dual solution
structure for the case of (βt, θt) ∈ ΩIIt (λ∗). Similarly, the
set ΩIIt (·), defined in (18), is time-dependent and affected by
the shadow price λ. Moreover, the case of (βt, θt) ∈ ΩIIt (λ∗)
corresponds to strong-sensitivity and high-valuation state, de-
noted by the blue region in Fig. 1. In this case, the MU’s
computation capacity cannot meet his computation tasks
ptct+rtλ
∗
cte′t(ct)
dtλ
∗
u′t(1)
ΩIt(λ
∗)
ΩIIt (λ
∗)
ΩIIIt (λ
∗)
ΩIVt (λ
∗)
βt
θt
Fig. 1: Regimes of MU’s state.
due to the strong-sensitivity (i.e., a large βt value). There-
fore, in spite of the full acquiring decision (i.e., x∗t = 1),
the MU tends to partially offload his computation task for
remote execution (i.e., 0 < zIIt (λ
∗) < 1).
Lemma 3. The optimal primal-dual solution (x∗, z∗, λ∗) sat-
isfies (x∗t , z
∗
t ) =
(
xIIIt (λ
∗), zIIIt (λ
∗)
)
for the case of (βt, θt) ∈
ΩIIIt (λ
∗), where xIIIt (·) and zIIIt (·) are given by
xIIIt (λ) = u
′−1
t
(
ptct+(dt+rt)λ
θt
)
, (19a)
zIIIt (λ) = x
III
t (λ)− e′−1t
(
ptct+rtλ
βtct
)/
ct, (19b)
where u′−1t (·) represents the inverse function of u′t(·). Moreover,
the set ΩIIIt (·) is
ΩIIIt (λ) ,
{
(β, θ) : ptct+(dt+rt)λ
u′t
(
e′−1t (
ctpt+rtλ
βct
)
/
ct
) ≤ θ ≤
ptct+(dt+rt)λ
u′t(1)
}
.
(20)
Lemma 3 presents the optimal primal-dual solution
structure for the case of (βt, θt) ∈ ΩIIIt (λ∗). The set ΩIIIt (·),
defined in (20), corresponds to the strong-sensitivity and low-
valuation state, denoted by the green region in Fig. 1. Differ-
ent from Lemma 2, the MU in this case will only consume
part of the slot on the content service (i.e., 0 < xIIIt (λ
∗) < 1)
due to the low-valuation (i.e., a small θt value).
Lemma 4. The optimal primal-dual solution (x∗, z∗, λ∗) satis-
fies (x∗t , z
∗
t ) =
(
xIVt (λ
∗), 0
)
for the case of (βt, θt) ∈ ΩIVt (λ∗),
where xIVt (·) satisfies
θtu
′
t
(
xIVt
)− βcte′t (xIVt ct) = dtλ, (21)
and the set ΩIVt (·) is given by
ΩIVt (λ) ,
{
(β, θ) : θ < ptct+(dt+rt)λ
u′t
(
e′−1t (
ctpt+rtλ
βct
)
/
ct
) ,
θ ≤ βcte′t(ct)+dtλu′t(1)
}
.
(22)
Lemma 4 presents the optimal primal-dual solution
structure for the case of (βt, θt) ∈ ΩIVt (λ∗). The set ΩIVt (·),
defined in (22), corresponds to the weak-sensitivity and low-
valuation state, denoted by the red region in Fig. 1. Specifi-
cally, the low valuation and weak sensitivity enable the MU
to be “self-sufficiency” in terms of the computation capacity.
Accordingly, the MU tends to consume part of the slot on
the content service (i.e., 0 < xIVt (λ
∗) < 1) under the pure
local execution mode (i.e., z∗t = 0).
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(x∗, z∗) given the optimal shadow price λ∗ with respect to
four cases in Lemmas 1∼4, respectively. It is obvious that the
payoff-maximizing MU will never choose edge-execution if
the price pt ≥ E¯ for any t ∈ T , where E¯ is given by
E¯ , max
t∈T
{βt · e′t(c¯)}. (23)
This implies that the pricing strategy p¯ , [E¯, E¯, ..., E¯] cor-
responds to the case where ESP does not offer edge service,
i.e., VESP(p¯) = 0. This observation provides a critical price
upper bound when we analyze the ESP’s pricing policy in
Section 6.
4.2.3 Optimal Shadow Price
Lemmas 1∼4 imply that the shadow price λ plays a
significant role on the KKT analysis. Before deriving the
optimal shadow price λ∗, for notation simplicity, we define
a mapping Wt(λ) for each t ∈ T (based on Lemmas 1∼4) as
follows:
Wt(λ) ,

(1, 0) , if (βt, θt) ∈ ΩIt(λ),(
1, zIIt (λ)
)
, if (βt, θt) ∈ ΩIIt (λ),(
xIIIt (λ), z
III
t (λ)
)
, if (βt, θt) ∈ ΩIIIt (λ),(
xIVt (λ), 0
)
, if (βt, θt) ∈ ΩIVt (λ),
(24)
where Wt(·) : R → R2 maps from a shadow price value
to the MU’s one-slot acquiring decision and executing deci-
sion. We denote the potential data usage under λ as:
A(λ) ,
T∑
t=1
h˜t
(
Wt(λ)
)
, (25)
where h˜t(·), defined in (11b), takes the MU’s acquiring deci-
sion and executing decision as the input, and represents the
MU’s wireless data usage in slot t. Note that the potential
data usage A(λ) is weakly-decreasing in λ. That is, a higher
shadow price leads to less wireless data usage.
Lemma 5 presents the optimal shadow price.
Lemma 5. The optimal dual solution λ∗ satisfying the KKT
conditions of Problem 2 is given by
λ∗ = min(pi, λ†), (26)
where λ† is defined as follows
λ† , min
λ≥0
λ s.t. A(λ) ≤ Q. (27)
Lemma 5 implies that the optimal primal-dual solution
of Problem 2 has two possibilities.
• If A(pi) > Q, then we have λ† > pi according to the
definition (27). Therefore, the optimal shadow price
is the same as the per-unit fee according to (26), i.e.,
λ∗ = pi. In this case, the MU has a large wireless data
demand, thus is charged overage fee pi [A(λ∗)−Q] for
the over usage A(λ∗)−Q.
• If A(pi) ≤ Q, then we have λ† ≤ pi according to the
definition (27). Therefore, the optimal shadow price is
the same as λ† according to (26), i.e., λ∗ = λ†. In this
case, the MU has a small wireless data demand, thus
the monthly data cap Q is sufficient, i.e., Q ≥ A(λ∗).
Theorem 1 presents the optimal solution of Problem 2
based on the previous KKT analysis in Lemmas 1∼5. Due to
space limit, the detailed proof is given in an online technical
report [34].
Theorem 1. The shadow price λ∗ given in (26) together with the
primal solutions (x∗t , z
∗
t ) = Wt(λ
∗) for any t ∈ T satisfy the
KKT conditions of Problem 2.
By now, we have solved the MU’s off-line J-CATO prob-
lem based on the KKT conditions of Problem 2. The above
KKT analysis implies the significance of the shadow price of
the wireless data usage. It also motivates the strategy of the
online context in Section 5.
5 MU ONLINE STRATEGY
This section focuses on the MU’s online J-CATO problem
and proposes an online strategy. Specifically, Section 5.1
elaborates the basic idea. We then analyze the theoretic
performance in Section 5.2.
5.1 Basic Idea and Strategy
Recall that the MU’s online payoff maximization prob-
lem is given by
max
x,z
T∑
t=1
f˜t(xt, zt)− pi
[
T∑
t=1
h˜t(xt, zt)−Q
]+
−Π (28a)
s.t. 0 ≤ zt ≤ xt ≤ 1, ∀t ∈ T . (28b)
The above problem in (28) share some similarity with
the Lyapunov optimization framework [35]. But (28) is more
challenging, since the second term in the objective (28a), i.e.,
pi[
∑T
t=1 h˜t(xt, zt) − Q]+, is non-additive over time. There
have been some studies (e.g., [36], [37]) focusing on the
problems with additive objective and long-term constraints.
But our problem is more general as the piece-wise linear
term in (28a) degenerates into a long-term constraint when
pi substantially increases. Next we introduce our method
based on the insights discussed in Section 4. We start with
defining the following augmented Lagrangian function for
each time slot t ∈ T :
Lt(xt, zt, λ) , f˜t(xt, zt)− λ ·
(
h˜t(xt, zt)− QT
)
, (29)
where λ ∈ [0, pi] is the shadow price. Particularly, it is
obvious that minimizing
∑T
t=1 Lt(xt, zt, λ) over λ ∈ [0, pi]
leads to the MU’s monthly payoff S˜(x, z). That is, the
following equality holds
S˜(x, z) = min
λ∈[0,pi]
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, zt, λ)−Π, ∀(x, z), (30)
which implies the inherent relation between the augmented
Lagrangian in (29) and the MU’s monthly payoff S˜(x, z).
We present the strategy A for MU’s online J-CATO
problem in Algorithm 1. In each slot t ∈ T , the strategy A
mainly includes two steps, which are elaborated as follows.
• Line 3: The MU determines (xˆt, zˆt) according to the
current shadow price λˆt and the function Wt(·) defined
in (24). Based on our off-line analysis in Section 4,
this step essentially generates for the MU the optimal
acquiring and executing decisions with respect to the
current shadow price λˆt.
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Input : Initial Ut(·) and Et(·) for any t ∈ T .
Output: (xˆ, zˆ) and λˆ.
1 Initial λˆ1 = 0 and step size η = {ηt : ∀t ∈ T }.
2 for t = 1 to T do
3 Determine (xˆt, zˆt) based on λˆt according to
(xˆt, zˆt) = Wt
(
λˆt
)
. (31)
4 Update λˆt+1 based on (xˆt, zˆt) according to
λˆt+1 = P[0,pi]
(
λˆt + ηt
[
h˜t(xˆt, zˆt)− QT
])
. (32)
• Line 4: The MU updates the shadow price λ˜t+1 accord-
ing to the current wireless data usage h˜t(xˆt, zˆt) and
the average quota q , Q/T . The notation P[0,pi](·) in
(32) is a projection to the interval [0, pi]. If the current
wireless data usage is greater (or smaller) than the
average quota, then the MU will increase (or decrease)
the shadow price with an appropriate step-size ηt.
5.2 Performance Analysis
We elaborate the performance of the strategy A in terms
of the MU’s average monthly payoff gap between the de-
cisions (xˆ, zˆ) and the optimal decisions in hindsight, i.e.,
(x∗, z∗) = arg max S˜(x, z). That is, we are interested in
GT (A) , 1
T
[
S˜(x∗, z∗)− S˜(xˆ, zˆ)
]
. (33)
As we will see later, the performance mainly depends on
two factors, i.e., demand divergence and consumption fluctua-
tion. We first formally define the two factors in Definitions 1
and 2, respectively.
Definition 1 (Demand Divergence). Given the MU’s content
service realization (d, r, c), the demand divergence (with respect
to the average quota q , Q/T ) in slot t is
ξt ,
∣∣q − dt − rt∣∣. (34)
Accordingly, the maximal demand divergence is given by
Ξ = max
(∣∣q − d¯− r¯∣∣, q) . (35)
Definition 2 (Consumption Fluctuation). Given the MU’s
optimal decisions (x∗, z∗) in hindsight, the per-slot leftover quota
(comparing to the average quota q , Q/T ) is lt = q−h˜t(x∗t , z∗t ).
Hence l¯ =
∑T
t=1 lt/T is the average leftover quota. The consump-
tion fluctuation up to slot t is
ψt ,
∣∣t · l¯ −∑ti=1 li∣∣. (36)
Accordingly, the maximal consumption fluctuation is given by
Ψ , max
1≤t≤T
ψt. (37)
Basically, ψt measures the absolute different between the
cumulative leftover quota and the average case up to the t-
th slot. In an extreme case where the MU equally consumes
wireless data every day (i.e., h˜t(x∗t , z
∗
t ) are identical for any
t ∈ T ), then the fluctuation is zero (i.e., ψt = 0 for any t).
Theorem 2 presents the MU’s payoff gap under the
strategy A. The proof is given in [34].
Theorem 2. The solution (xˆ, zˆ) generated by strategy A in
Algorithm 1 achieves the following MU payoff gap
GT (A) ≤ 1T
(
pi2
2
1
ηT
+
(
Ξ2
2 + ΞΨ
) T∑
t=1
ηt
)
, (38)
where Ξ and Ψ are defined in Definition 1 and Definition 2,
respectively. Moreover, with the step-size ηt = piΞ√T , we have
GT (A) ≤ pi(Ξ+Ψ)√T . (39)
Theorem 2 shows that the performance of strategy A
depends on the overage fee pi besides the aforementioned
demand divergence and consumption fluctuation. This is
because that the crucial uncertainty of MU’s online J-CATO
problem is the optimal shadow price, which is related to pi.
We will also illustrate this in Section 7.1.
So far, we have intorduced the MU’s online problem and
proposed an online strategy. The MU’s online problem is
closely related to the ESP’s online pricing problem, since
they all need to make the decisions sequentially in each slot.
will be introduced next.
6 ESP PRICING PROBLEM
In this section, we study how ESP monetizes the edge
computing service and propose a pricing policy.
Recall that ESP’s total revenue from all the MUs N
over the period T is given in (6). Due to the asymmetric
information, however, ESP cannot explicitly predict how
the MUs response to its pricing decisions. This motivates
us to design a pricing policy P that iteratively learns how
to monetize the edge computing service without relying on
the market information. Later on, we will choose the ex post
optimal revenue as our benchmark and compare the revenue
generated by the pricing policy P with the ex post optimal
revenue. Basically, the ex post optimal revenue is given by
V ?ESP , max
p≥pmin
T∑
t=1
N∑
n=1
p · cn,t · zn,t(p), (40)
where zn,t(p) represents the MU n’s executing decision
given the price p. In addition, pmin > 0 corresponds to the
potential minimum price in the practical market.
Next we introduce the proposed pricing policy in Section
6.1. We then present the performance in Section 6.2.
6.1 Pricing Policy
We now introduce our proposed pricing policy P based
on the following three aspects.
6.1.1 Price Discretization
We consider a set K = {1, 2, ...,K} of price candidates,
consisting of all powers of 1 +  between the minimal
price pmin and the potential maximal price E¯ (defined in
(23)). Mathematically, we denote the k-th price candidate as
p(k) = pmin(1 + )
k for any k ∈ K. Accordingly, we have
K = blog1+ E¯/pminc, where b·c is the floor function. It is
obvious that the parameter  > 0 affects both the number of
price candidates and the performance of pricing policy P .
We will discuss it in Section 6.2.
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6.1.2 Basic Idea
The basic idea of the pricing policy P is to iteratively
exploit and explore the price candidates across the MU pop-
ulation N within the operation period T . More specifically,
the pricing policy P maintains (in each slot t) a weight
vector ωt = [ωt(1), ωt(2), ..., ωt(K)] for all of the price can-
didates. The weight of the k-th candidate in slot t, denoted
by ωt(k), is positively related to its previous performance
(in terms of the generated revenue). Overall, policy P tends
to choose the price candidate with good performance (i.e.,
exploitation) and keep an eye on the other candidates that
may perform better in the future (i.e., exploration).
6.1.3 Policy Description
Algorithm 2 describes the pricing policy P . We elaborate
it in details as follows.
Line 4: The pricing policy P will offer MU n edge service
in price p(κn,t) in slot t by randomly selecting κn,t accord-
ing to the probability distribution ht(k), defined in (42).
Specifically, the probability distribution ht(k) is the com-
bination of two parts tuned by a parameter γ ∈ (0, 1). The
first part (with the coefficient 1− γ), i.e., ωt(k)/
∑K
k=1 ωt(k),
represents the exploitation on the good-perform candidates.
Note that a larger weight corresponds to a higher probabil-
ity to be selected. The second part (with the coefficient γ),
i.e., (1 + )k/
∑K
i=1(1 + )
i, represents the exploration over
all candidates. Moreover, the exploration scheme here pays
more attention to the higher price candidates instead of the
uniform exploration.
Line 5: ESP will receive the payment Vt,n(κt,n) from MU
n at the end of slot t. Accordingly, we denote the total
revenue generated by the pricing policy P as
VESP(P) ,
T∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
Vt,n(κt,n), (41)
where κt,n is a random variable due to the randomness in
Line 4 of Algorithm 2. In later performance analysis, we will
focus on the expected revenue, denoted by E [VESP(P)].
Lines 6-9: The pricing policy P updates the weight vec-
tor for the next slot based on the revenue in the current
slot. Specifically, in Line 7, we compute the actual revenue
generated by each price candidate under the random vector
κt = (κt,n : n ∈ N ) in slot t, denoted by Vt(k,κt). In
Line 8, we compute the virtual candidate revenue Vˆt(k,κt)
by appropriately normalizing Vt(k,κ). Eventually in Line 9,
we update the weight ωt+1(k) by multiplying the current
weight ωt(k) by an exponential expression with the base
1 + δ and the exponent Vˆt(k,κ).
So far, we have introduced the pricing policy P with
parameters (, γ, δ). Next we focus on its performance.
6.2 Performance Analysis
We measure the performance of the pricing policy P in
terms of the expected revenue E [VESP(P)]. Specifically, we
will compare it with V ?ESP defined in (40), i.e., the revenue
achieved by the optimal fixed pricing in hindsight. Overall,
we will demonstrate the performance of the following form:
E [VESP(P)] ≥ V
?
ESP
α
−O
(
NE¯c¯ ln
(
ln
(
E¯
pmin
)))
, (47)
Algorithm 2: ESP’s Dynamic Pricing Policy P
1 Initial (, γ, δ) and the weight ω1(k) = 1,∀k ∈ K.
2 for t = 1 to T do
3 for MU n ∈ N do
4 Offer MU n the edge service in price p(κt,n),
where κt,n ∈ K is randomly drawn based on
ht(k) , (1−γ)ωt(k)K∑
k=1
ωt(k)
+ γ·(1+)
k
K∑
i=1
(1+)i
, ∀k ∈ K. (42)
5 Receive MU n’s payment Vt,n(κt,n) as follows
Vt,n(κt,n) = p(κt,n) · cn,t · zn,t
(
p(κt,n)
)
. (43)
6 for k ∈ K do
7 Compute candidate revenue Vt(k,κt)
Vt(k,κt) ,
∑
n∈N Vt,n(κt,n) · 1{κt,n=k}. (44)
8 Compute virtual candidate revenue Vˆt(k,κt)
Vˆt(k,κt) , Vt(k,κt)Nc¯pmin ·
γ
ht(k)
K∑
i=1
(1+)i
. (45)
9 Update weight ωt+1(k)
ωt+1(k) , ωt(k) · (1 + δ)Vˆt(k,κt). (46)
which means that the pricing policy P achieves a constant
fraction of the ex post optimal revenue V ?ESP with an extra
loss term (that does not depend on the operation period
length T ). The above performance structure is given in
Theorem 3 based on Lemma 6 and Lemma 7. All proofs
are given in [34]. Before presenting the results, for notation
simplicity, we denote ESP’s revenue under the k-th price
candidate as follows:
V TESP(k) =
T∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
p(k) · cn,t · z∗n,t
(
p(k)
)
, ∀k ∈ K. (48)
It is obvious that we have V ?ESP ≥ maxk∈K V TESP(k) due to
the price discretization. Nevertheless, Lemma 6 shows that
rounding down to a power of 1+will reduce ESP’s revenue
at most a factor of 1 + .
Lemma 6. There exists a price candidate κ ∈ K such that the
ESP’s revenue under the price p(κ) = pmin(1 + )κ satisfies
V TESP(κ) ≥
V ?ESP
1 + 
. (49)
Lemma 6 builds up the relationship between the rev-
enue under the discrete price candidates and the optimal
revenue under the continuous pricing space, depending on
the parameter . Lemma 7 further builds up the relationship
between the expected revenue under the pricing policy P
and the revenue under the discrete price candidate.
Lemma 7. With the parameters (, δ, γ), the pricing policy P
described in Algorithm 2 can achieve
E
[
V TESP(P)
] ≥ (1− γ) (1− δ2)V TESP(k)− Φ(, δ, γ),∀k ∈ K,
(50)
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where Φ(, δ, γ) is a constant and given by
Φ(, δ, γ) =
1− γ
γ
· 1 + 

· NE¯c¯
δ
· ln
(
ln
(
E¯/pmin
)
ln(1 + )
)
. (51)
Lemma 7 indicates that the pricing policy P can achieve
at least a constant fraction of the revenue under arbitrary
price candidate with an additional loss term. Note that the
loss term Φ(, δ, γ) in (50) does not depend on the time
slot number T . This means that Φ(, δ, γ) is increasingly
negligible as T increases. Furthermore, we obtain Theorem
3 by combining Lemma 6 and Lemma 7.
Theorem 3. With the parameters (, δ, γ), the pricing policy P
described in Algorithm 2 can achieve
E
[
V TESP(P)
]
≥ (1− γ)
(
1− δ2
)
1 + 
V ?ESP − Φ(, δ, γ). (52)
Theorem 3 presents the performance form mentioned
in (47). To have a better understanding on Theorem 3, we
further provide the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If the optimal revenue ESP satisfies V ?ESP ≥
8
αΦ
(
α
3 ,
α
6 ,
α
12
)
for some constant α ∈ (0, 1], then the pricing
policy P with the parameters (, δ, γ) = (α3 , α6 , α12) can achieve
E
[
V TESP(P)
]
≥ V
?
ESP
1 + α
. (53)
Corollary 1 shows that under some mild condition the
pricing policy P with appropriate parameters is (1 + α)-
competitive. Moreover, the condition corresponds to a lower
bound of the ex post optimal revenue V ?ESP. Although the lower
bound 8α ·Φ
(
α
3 ,
α
6 ,
α
12
)
increases in α, it does not scale in T .
This means that the condition will hold as ESP’s the edge
service monetization goes on.
7 NUMERICAL RESULTS
We carry out extensive evaluations on the mobile In-
ternet ecosystem based on our previous analysis. We will
quantify the MU’s online strategy A and ESP’s pricing
policy P in Section 7.1 and Section 7.2, respectively. We then
evaluate the economic impact of the edge service on the
entire ecosystem in Section 7.3.
7.1 Evaluation on MU’s JOCP Strategy
We will evaluate the performance of the MU’s strategy
A in terms of the monthly payoff. We first introduce the
evaluation set-up, and then demonstrate the results.
Evaluation Set-Up: Recall that each MU is associated with
the random content service model. We specify the MU’s
content service model by randomly generating the three pa-
rameters dt, rt, and ct according to truncated normal distri-
butions on their supports [0, d¯], [0, c¯], and [0, r¯], respectively.
In addition, the preference of MU is characterized based
on the satisfaction and dissatisfaction. We adopt the well-
known alpha-fair utility to represent the MU’s satisfaction,
i.e., u(x) = x
1−a
1−a . Moreover, we use a quadratic function
to model MU’s cost of local execution, i.e., e(s) = s2/2.
Furthermore, we randomly generate the MU’s valuation
parameter θt and sensitivity parameter βt according to
a truncated normal distribution with the range [0, 2] for
normalization consideration, i.e., E[θt] = E[βt] = 1.
Under the above evaluation set-up, we will compare the
MU’s monthly payoff in the following three cases:
• The case of Opt corresponds to the off-line optimal
outcome discussed in Theorem 1.
• The case of Alg1 corresponds to the proposed online
strategy A defined in Algorithm 1.
• The case of Greedy corresponds to the greedy strategy
that tends to maximize the daily payoff without taking
into account the potential future over usage.2
We visualize the MU’s monthly payoff through box-plots
in Fig. 2, where the three sub-figures investigate the impact
of the monthly data cap, the edge service price, and the
overage fee, respectively.
Fig. 2(a) shows how the edge service price p affects the
MU’s monthly payoff in the aforementioned three cases. For
the visualization purpose, we set the same daily edge ser-
vice price here. Overall the MU’s monthly payoff decreases
in the edge service price, as the higher price means that it is
less likely for MU to utilize the edge service to reduce the
local execution cost. The small gaps between the red boxes
and the blue boxes indicate the good performance of the
strategy A, which achieves 95% of the payoff in case Opt.
Fig. 2(b) shows that the MU’s monthly payoff increases
in his monthly data cap. Comparing the blue boxes and the
red boxes in Fig. 2(b), we find that the MU’s payoff achieved
by the strategy A is very close to the optimal payoff in
hindsight. Comparing the green boxes and the red boxes in
Fig. 2(b), we find that the payoff gap between our strategy
A and the greedy strategy differs in the monthly data cap.
The intuitions are as follows:
• A small data cap (e.g., Q = 0.4GB in Fig. 2(b)) implies
that the MU’s wireless data demand will exceed the
monthly data cap in most cases. Thus the shadow price
updating in strategy A will quickly converge to λˆt = pi,
which is similar to the case of greedy strategy. Hence
there is a little gap between Alg1 and Greedy when the
data cap is small.
• A large data cap (e.g., Q = 3.9GB in Fig. 2(b)) implies
that the MU’s wireless data demand is less than the
monthly data cap in most cases. Thus the shadow price
in strategy A will quickly converge to λˆt = 0, which
is similar to the case of greedy strategy. Hence there is
a little payoff gap between Alg1 and Greedy when the
data cap is small.
• A medium data cap (e.g., Q = 2.5GB in Fig. 2(b))
means that the MU’s wireless data demand and the
monthly data cap are comparable, thus there is a great
uncertainty for the MU’s cap-acquiring outcome. In this
case, the greedy strategy fails in learning the optimal
shadow price, thus the payoff gap between Alg1 and
Greedy is large.
Fig. 2(c) plots how the overage fee pi affects the MU’s
monthly payoff in the three cases. Overall a larger overage
fee corresponds to lower MU payoff. However, comparing
2. The greedy policy means that the MU is myopic. It is a reasonable
benchmark for two reasons. First, it is easy to implement, since it does
not requires that MUs should know the future information. Second, it
also captures the bounded rationality behavior for MUs [38].
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Fig. 2: Performance evaluation on the MU’s strategy A.
the green boxes and the red boxes in Fig. 2(c), we note that
our strategy A is less sensitive to the overage fee than the
greedy strategy. This is because that our strategy A can
iteratively learn the shadow price (based on MU’s previous
decisions), which helps the MU avoid great monetary cost
for exceeding the monthly data cap. While the greedy policy,
aiming at the myopic benefit, cannot prevent it. Moreover,
the MU’s monthly payoff under the strategy A is 93% (on
average) of the payoff in the case of Opt.
7.2 Evaluation on ESP’s Pricing Policy
We evaluate the performance of ESP’s pricing policy P in
terms of its total revenue from a group of MUs. Specifically,
we take into account a total of five hundred MUs with
randomly generated parameters as in Section 7.1. Recall that
the ESP’s pricing policy P defined in Algorithm 2 depends
on three parameters (i.e., , γ, and δ), which will jointly
affect the theoretic performance of the pricing policy P . In
our evaluation, we set the three parameters according to
Corollary 1 with α = 1. That is, the ESP’s total revenue
achieved by the pricing policyP is at least 50% of the ex post
optimal revenue if the condition in Corollary 1 holds (which
is true in our evaluation setup). We run the evaluation for
one hundred times and show the results in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.
Fig. 3 plots the performance of the pricing policy P
under different values of the maximal data-usage d¯. We
compare ESP’s revenue under the pricing policy P (labeled
by Alg2) with the ex post optimal revenue (labeled by Opt).
• Fig. 3(a) plots the ESP’s average revenue in the two
cases. Specifically, the two curves with markers repre-
sent the average results (over multiple runs). The red
and blue regions correspond to the three-sigma ranges.
Overall ESP’s revenue decreases in the maximal data
usage level d¯. Intuitively, a larger d¯ value means that
MUs have greater wireless data demand from the con-
tent delivery, thus less wireless data quota to offloading
computation tasks.
• Fig. 3(b) shows the ESP’s revenue ratio of case Alg2 to
case Opt through box-plot. The yellow curve represents
the mean results over multiple runs. We note that
the pricing policy P actually achieves (on average) a
fraction 83% of the ex post optimal revenue, which is
much better than the theoretic lower bound (i.e., 50% in
our evaluation setup).
Fig. 4 shows the impact of the maximal raw data amount
r¯ on the pricing policy P . Similarly, we compare the ESP’s
revenue under the pricing policy P (labeled by Alg2) with
the ex post optimal revenue (labeled by Opt).
• Fig. 4(a) shows that the ESP’s revenue decreases in the
maximal raw data amount. This is because that a larger
r¯ value means a greater offloading cost for the MUs,
leading to a lower demand on the edge service.
• Fig. 4(b) shows that the pricing policy P can achieve (on
average) a fraction 79% of the ex post optimal revenue,
which is much better than the theoretic lower bound.
So far, we have illustrated the performance of the MU’s
strategy A and the ESP’s pricing policy P . Next we further
evaluate the economic effect of the edge service on the entire
mobile Internet ecosystem.
7.3 Economic Impact of Edge Service
We evaluate how the edge service affect the entire
ecosystem, including MUs’ payoffs, ISP’s revenue, and CP’s
revenue. Recall that the ISP’s revenue, defined in (7), con-
sists of the subscription fee and the overage fee. In our
evaluation, we consider the wireless data plan with data cap
Q = 1GB, subscription fee Π = $10, and per-unit overage
fee pi = $15/GB. Furthermore, the CPs’ revenue, defined in
(8), mainly comes from displaying advertisements, thus is
positively related to MUs’ total content acquisitions. In our
evaluation, we follow [15] and suppose that the advertising
revenue takes the form v(x) , x1−τ/(1 − τ). Based on the
above setup, we will compare the following two cases.
• The case of None represents the classic mobile Internet
ecosystem without edge service. MUs will execute the
computation tasks locally.
• The case of Edge represents the ecosystem with ESP
offering edge service based on the pricing policy P .
Fig. 5 plots the economic impact of the edge service on
the ecosystem. The horizontal axis of the four sub-figures
represents the maximal computation-intensity c¯. Moreover,
Fig. 5(a), Fig. 5(b), and Fig. 5(c) shows the average benefits
(i.e., revenue or payoff) of ISP, CPs, and MUs, respectively.
Fig. 5(d) shows the social welfare.
In Fig. 5(a), the black star curve and green square curve
show the MUs’ payoffs in case None and case Edge, respec-
tively. Overall, the MUs’ payoffs decrease in c¯. This is be-
cause that the greater computation-intensity reduces MUs’
content acquisitions due to the resource-limited devices and
the costly edge service. However, comparing the two curves
in Fig. 5(a), we find that the edge service improves MUs’
payoffs (up to 63%), as it alleviates the local execution cost.
In Fig. 5(b), the black star curve and blue triangle curve
show the revenue of CPs in case None and case Edge, re-
spectively. As mentioned, the greater computation-intensity
reduces MUs’ content acquisitions, which eventually leads
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Fig. 3: ESP’s revenue versus maximal usage level d¯.
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Fig. 5: Economic effect of edge service on the ecosystem.
to the decreasing revenue for CPs. Nevertheless, the edge
service can stimulate the MUs’ content acquisitions, which
improves the revenue of CPs (up to 37%).
In Fig. 5(c), the black star curve and red circle curve show
the revenue of ISP in case None and case Edge, respectively.
ISP’s revenue decreases in the computation-intensity c¯, as
the greater computation-intensity reduces MUs’ content ac-
quisitions. However, comparing the two curves in Fig. 5(c),
we find that the edge service increases the revenue of ISP
(up to 40%) as it stimulates MUs’ content acquisitions.
Fig. 5(d) compares the social welfares. The black star
curve corresponds to the case of None. The red circle curve
represents the total welfare of MUs, CPs, and ISP under
the case of Edge. The blue triangle curve plots the social
welfare of MUs, CPs, ISP, and ESP under the case of Edge.
Comparing the three curves, it is obvious that the edge
service can significantly increase the social welfare of the
mobile Internet ecosystem.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper studies the economic interactions in the mo-
bile Internet ecosystem. Specifically, we investigate the MUs’
Joint Content Acquisition and Task Offloading (J-CATO)
problem and design an online strategy with provable perfor-
mance based on the off-line insights. Moreover, we propose
for ESP an edge service pricing policy that does not rely
on any market information. We find that the edge service
helps the MUs reduce the local execution cost, leading to
higher average MU payoff. In addition, the edge service
also stimulates MUs’ content acquisitions, which increases
the ISP’s benefit from wireless data service and CPs’ benefit
from content service. Therefore, the edge service leads to
higher social benefit for the ecosystem.
As this is the first study on monetizing edge service,
there are some open problems that deserve investigation.
• It is necessary to study different business models. We
view the edge service provider as a third-part. In prac-
tice, both the ISP and giant CP can deploy edge data
center and monetize the edge computing service. This
leads to different value chains together with different
economic insights.
• It is also interesting to take into account the ESP’s
investment cost on the edge servers. In that case, the
ESP faces a new issue, i.e., whether it can recoup the
investment within the lifetime of the edge servers.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work is supported by the National Natural Science
Foundation of China (Grant No. 61972113 and 61801145),
Shenzhen Science and Technology Program (Grant
No. JCYJ20190806112215116, JCYJ20180306171800589, and
KQTD20190929172545139), Guangdong Science and Tech-
nology Planning Project under Grant 2018B030322004. This
work is also supported in part by the funding from Shen-
zhen Institute of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics for
Society.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Sen, C. Joe-Wong, S. Ha, and M. Chiang, “A survey of smart
data pricing: Past proposals, current plans, and future trends,”
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), vol. 46, no. 2, p. 15, 2013.
[2] A. Dhamdhere and C. Dovrolis, “Twelve years in the evolution
of the internet ecosystem,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
(ToN), vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 1420–1433, 2011.
[3] L. Zheng, C. Joe-Wong, C. W. Tan, S. Ha, and M. Chiang, “Cus-
tomized data plans for mobile users: Feasibility and benefits of
data trading,” IEEE journal on selected areas in communications,
vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 949–963, 2017.
[4] Z. Wang, L. Gao, and J. Huang, “Multi-cap optimization for
wireless data plans with time flexibility,” IEEE Transactions on
Mobile Computing, 2019.
[5] Y. C. Hu, M. Patel, D. Sabella, N. Sprecher, and V. Young, “Mobile
edge computinga key technology towards 5g,” ETSI white paper,
vol. 11, no. 11, pp. 1–16, 2015.
[6] S. Shakkottai and R. Srikant, “Economics of network pricing with
multiple isps,” IEEE/ACM Transactions On Networking, vol. 14,
no. 6, pp. 1233–1245, 2006.
[7] R. T. Ma and V. Misra, “The public option: a nonregulatory alterna-
tive to network neutrality,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking,
vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 1866–1879, 2013.
14
[8] L. He and J. Walrand, “Pricing and revenue sharing strategies
for internet service providers,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
Communications, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 942–951, 2006.
[9] R. T. Ma, D. M. Chiu, J. Lui, V. Misra, and D. Rubenstein, “In-
ternet economics: The use of shapley value for isp settlement,”
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON), vol. 18, no. 3, pp.
775–787, 2010.
[10] P. Hande, M. Chiang, R. Calderbank, and J. Zhang, “Pricing
under constraints in access networks: Revenue maximization and
congestion management,” in IEEE INFOCOM, 2010, pp. 1–9.
[11] R. T. Ma, “Usage-based pricing and competition in congestible
network service markets,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
(TON), vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 3084–3097, 2016.
[12] L. Zheng, C. Joe-Wong, M. Andrews, and M. Chiang, “Optimizing
data plans: Usage dynamics in mobile data networks,” in IEEE
INFOCOM, 2018, pp. 2474–2482.
[13] Z. Wang, L. Gao, J. Huang, and B. Shou, “Economic viability of
data trading with rollover,” in IEEE INFOCOM, 2019, pp. 1846–
1854.
[14] Y. Wu, H. Kim, P. H. Hande, M. Chiang, and D. H. Tsang,
“Revenue sharing among isps in two-sided markets,” in IEEE
INFOCOM, 2011, pp. 596–600.
[15] C. Joe-Wong, S. Sen, and S. Ha, “Sponsoring mobile data: analyz-
ing the impact on internet stakeholders,” IEEE/ACM Transactions
on Networking, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 1179–1192, 2018.
[16] Y. Mao, C. You, J. Zhang, K. Huang, and K. B. Letaief, “A survey on
mobile edge computing: The communication perspective,” IEEE
Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 2322–2358,
2017.
[17] Z. Zhou, X. Chen, E. Li, L. Zeng, K. Luo, and J. Zhang, “Edge
intelligence: Paving the last mile of artificial intelligence with edge
computing,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 107, no. 8, pp. 1738–1762,
2019.
[18] C. You, K. Huang, H. Chae, and B.-H. Kim, “Energy-efficient
resource allocation for mobile-edge computation offloading,” IEEE
Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 1397–
1411, 2016.
[19] Y. Sun, S. Zhou, and J. Xu, “Emm: Energy-aware mobility man-
agement for mobile edge computing in ultra dense networks,”
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 35, no. 11,
pp. 2637–2646, 2017.
[20] Z. Zhou, J. Feng, Z. Chang, and X. Shen, “Energy-efficient edge
computing service provisioning for vehicular networks: A con-
sensus admm approach,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology,
vol. 68, no. 5, pp. 5087–5099, 2019.
[21] Y. Mao, J. Zhang, S. Song, and K. B. Letaief, “Stochastic joint
radio and computational resource management for multi-user
mobile-edge computing systems,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications, vol. 16, no. 9, pp. 5994–6009, 2017.
[22] L. Yang, B. Liu, J. Cao, Y. Sahni, and Z. Wang, “Joint compu-
tation partitioning and resource allocation for latency sensitive
applications in mobile edge clouds,” IEEE Transactions on Services
Computing, 2019.
[23] Y. Wang, M. Sheng, X. Wang, L. Wang, and J. Li, “Mobile-edge
computing: Partial computation offloading using dynamic voltage
scaling,” IEEE Transactions on Communications, vol. 64, no. 10, pp.
4268–4282, 2016.
[24] Y. Mao, J. Zhang, and K. B. Letaief, “Dynamic computation
offloading for mobile-edge computing with energy harvesting
devices,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 34,
no. 12, pp. 3590–3605, 2016.
[25] F. Wang, J. Xu, X. Wang, and S. Cui, “Joint offloading and com-
puting optimization in wireless powered mobile-edge computing
systems,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 17,
no. 3, pp. 1784–1797, 2017.
[26] J. Xu, L. Chen, and S. Ren, “Online learning for offloading and
autoscaling in energy harvesting mobile edge computing,” IEEE
Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking, vol. 3,
no. 3, pp. 361–373, 2017.
[27] K. Poularakis, J. Llorca, A. M. Tulino, I. Taylor, and L. Tassiulas,
“Service placement and request routing in mec networks with stor-
age, computation, and communication constraints,” IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, 2020.
[28] J. Xu, L. Chen, and P. Zhou, “Joint service caching and task
offloading for mobile edge computing in dense networks,” in IEEE
INFOCOM, 2018.
[29] M. Tang, L. Gao, and J. Huang, “Enabling edge cooperation in
tactile internet via 3c resource sharing,” IEEE Journal on Selected
Areas in Communications, vol. 36, no. 11, pp. 2444–2454, 2018.
[30] X. Chen, L. Jiao, W. Li, and X. Fu, “Efficient multi-user compu-
tation offloading for mobile-edge cloud computing,” IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 2795–2808, 2015.
[31] M. Liu and Y. Liu, “Price-based distributed offloading for mobile-
edge computing with computation capacity constraints,” IEEE
Wireless Communications Letters, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 420–423, 2017.
[32] Z. Xiong, S. Feng, D. Niyato, P. Wang, A. Leshem, and Z. Han,
“Joint sponsored and edge caching content service market: A
game-theoretic approach,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Commu-
nications, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 1166–1181, 2019.
[33] J. Heckman et al., “Shadow prices, market wages, and labor
supply,” Econometrica, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 679–694, 1974.
[34] Online Technical Report at arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.04481.
[35] M. J. Neely, “Stochastic network optimization with application
to communication and queueing systems,” Synthesis Lectures on
Communication Networks, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 1–211, 2010.
[36] M. Mahdavi, R. Jin, and T. Yang, “Trading regret for efficiency:
online convex optimization with long term constraints,” Journal of
Machine Learning Research, vol. 13, no. Sep, pp. 2503–2528, 2012.
[37] N. Liakopoulos, A. Destounis, G. Paschos, T. Spyropoulos, and
P. Mertikopoulos, “Cautious regret minimization: Online opti-
mization with long-term budget constraints,” in International Con-
ference on Machine Learning, 2019, pp. 3944–3952.
[38] W. B. Arthur, “Inductive reasoning and bounded rationality,” The
American economic review, vol. 84, no. 2, pp. 406–411, 1994.
Zhiyuan Wang is currently a Post-Doctoral Fel-
low in Department of Computer Science and
Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong
Kong. He received his Ph.D. degree in Informa-
tion Engineering, from The Chinese University
of Hong Kong, in 2019. He received the B.S.
degree in Information Engineering, from South-
east University, Nanjing, in 2016. His research
interests include the field of network science and
game theory, with current emphasis on mean
field analysis and edge computing.
Lin Gao (S’08-M’10-SM’16) is an Associate Pro-
fessor with the School of Electronic and Informa-
tion Engineering, Harbin Institute of Technology,
Shenzhen, China. He received the Ph.D. degree
in Electronic Engineering from Shanghai Jiao
Tong University in 2010. His main research inter-
ests are in the area of network economics and
games, with applications in wireless communi-
cations and networking. He is the recipient of
the 11th IEEE ComSoc AsiaPacific Outstanding
Young Researcher Award in 2016.
Tong Wang (M’15) received the B.E. degree in
electrical engineering and automation from Bei-
hang University, China, in 2006, and the M.S.
degree in communications engineering and the
Ph.D. degree in electronic engineering from The
University of York, U.K., in 2008 and 2012, re-
spectively. From 2012 to 2015, he was a Re-
search Associate with the Institute for Theoret-
ical Information Technology, RWTH Aachen Uni-
versity, Aachen, Germany. From 2014 to 2015,
he was a Research Fellow of the Alexander von
Humboldt Foundation. He is an Assistant Professor in Department of
Electronic and Information Engineering, Harbin Institute of Technology,
Shenzhen, China. His research interests include sensor networks, co-
operative communications, adaptive filtering, and resource optimization.
15
Jingjing Luo received the B.S. and Ph.D. de-
grees from the Department of Electronics and
Information Engineering, Huazhong University
of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China, in
2010 and 2015, respectively. Since 2016, she
has been a Post-Doctoral Fellow with the De-
partment of Information Engineering, Chinese
University of Hong Kong. Her current research
interest includes scheduling and performance
analysis in data center networks and content-
centric networks.
APPENDIX A
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove this theorem based on the
KKT conditions of Problem 2. In this process, we actually
prove Proposition 1 and Lemmas 1∼4. For notation clarity,
we express Problem 2 as follows:
max
T∑
t=1
[
Ut(xt)− Et
(
(xt − zt)ct
)− ptztct]− pis (54a)
s.t. 0 ≤ zt ≤ xt, ∀t ∈ T , (54b)
s ≥
T∑
t=1
(dtxt + rtzt)−Q. (54c)
s ≥ 0, (54d)
xt ∈ [0, 1], ∀t ∈ T , (54e)
zt ∈ [0, 1], ∀t ∈ T , (54f)
var. x, z, s. (54g)
We let µt denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with
the constraint (54b). We denote λ and Λ as the Lagrangian
multipliers associated with the constraints (54c) and (54d),
respectively. Moreover, we let ξt and ψt denote the La-
grangian multipliers associated with the constraints xt ≤ 1
and zt ≤ 1 for any t ∈ T , respectively. Accordingly, the
Lagrangian of Problem 2 is given by
L(x, z, s, λ,Λ,µ)
=
T∑
t=1
[
Ut(xt)− Et
(
(xt − zt)ct
)− ptztct]− pis
+ λ
[
s+Q−
T∑
t=1
(dtxt + rtzt)
]
+ Λs,
+
T∑
t=1
[
µt(xt − zt) + ξt(1− xt) + ψt(1− zt)
]
.
(55)
We first express all the KKT conditions that are related
to the variable s as follows:
∂L
∂s
= λ+ Λ− pi = 0, (56a)
λ
[
s+Q−
T∑
t=1
(dtxt + rtzt)
]
= 0, (56b)
Λs = 0, (56c)
λ,Λ ≥ 0. (56d)
Note that equations (56) imply 0 ≤ λ ≤ pi, which
proves Proposition 1. Furthermore, we express all the KKT
conditions that are related to the variables xt and zt as
follows:
θtu
′
t(xt)− βtcte′t
(
(xt − zt)ct
)− λdt + µt − ξt = 0, (57a)
βtcte
′
t
(
(xt − zt)ct
)− ptct − λrt − µt − ψt = 0, (57b)
µt(xt − zt) = 0, (57c)
ξt(1− xt) = 0, (57d)
ψt(1− zt) = 0, (57e)
µt, ξt, ψt ≥ 0. (57f)
Next we derive the optimal primal-dual solutions based on
(57) in the four cases discussed in Lemmas 1∼4.
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According to the definition of set ΩIt(λ) in (16), the case
of (βt, θt) ∈ ΩIt(λ∗) indicates the following inequalities
θtu
′
t(1)− βtcte′t(ct)− λ∗dt > 0, (58a)
βtcte
′
t(ct)− ptct − λ∗rt < 0, (58b)
which imply x∗t = 1, z
∗
t = 0, µ
∗
t = 0, ξ
∗
t = 0, and ψ
∗
t = 0.
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
According to the definition of set ΩIIt (λ) in (18), the case
of (βt, θt) ∈ ΩIIt (λ∗) indicates the following inequalities
θtu
′
t(1)− βtcte′t(ct)− λ∗dt > 0, (59a)
βtcte
′
t(ct)− ptct − λ∗rt ≥ 0, (59b)
which imply x∗t = 1 and z
∗
t satisfies
βtcte
′
t
(
(1− z∗t )ct
)− ptct − λ∗rt = 0. (60)
Hence we have
zIIt (λ) , 1− e′−1t
(
ptct+rtλ
βtct
)/
ct, (61)
which completes the proof of Lemma 2
According to the definition of set ΩIIIt (λ) in (20), the case
of (βt, θt) ∈ ΩIIIt (λ∗) indicates the following inequalities
θtu
′
t(1)− βtcte′t(ct)− dtλ∗ ≤ 0, (62a)
u′−1t
(
ptct+(dt+rt)λ
θt
)
> e′−1t
(
ptct+rtλ
βtct
)/
ct, (62b)
which imply that the variables x∗t and z
∗
t satisfy the follow-
ing conditions:
θtu
′
t(x
∗
t )− βtcte′t
(
(x∗t − z∗t )ct
)− λ∗dt = 0, (63a)
βtcte
′
t
(
(x∗t − z∗t )ct
)− ptct − λ∗rt = 0, (63b)
and ξ∗t = ψ
∗
t = µ
∗
t = 0. Hence we have
xIIIt (λ) = u
′−1
t
(
ptct+(dt+rt)λ
θt
)
, (64a)
zIIIt (λ) = x
III
t (λ)− e′−1t
(
ptct+rtλ
βtct
)/
ct, (64b)
which completes the proof of Lemma 3.
According to the definition of set ΩIVt (λ) in (22), the case
of (βt, θt) ∈ ΩIVt (λ∗) indicates the following inequalities
θtu
′
t(1)− βtcte′t(ct)− dtλ∗ ≤ 0, (65a)
u′−1t
(
ptct+(dt+rt)λ
θt
)
≤ e′−1t
(
ptct+rtλ
βtct
)/
ct, (65b)
which imply that z∗t = 0 and x
∗
t satisfies
θtu
′
t (x
∗
t )− βcte′t (x∗t ct) = dtλ∗. (66)
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
The remaining part of proving this theorem is to derive
the optimal Lagrangian multiplier λ∗.
Based on the above discussions and the definition (25),
we have
T∑
t=1
dtx
∗
t (λ) + rtz
∗
t (λ) = A(λ). (67)
Hence the optimal Lagrangian multiplier λ∗ has two possi-
bilities:
• Based on (56), the case of A(pi) ≥ Q indicates that λ∗ =
pi, s∗ = A(pi)−Q ≥ 0.
• Based on (56), the case of A(pi) < Q indicates that s∗ =
0 and λ∗ = λ†.
This completes the proof of this theorem.
APPENDIX B
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove this theorem by deriving a
upper bound on the MU’s payoff gap. For notation simplic-
ity, we let λ? denote the shadow price associate with the
online decisions (xˆ, zˆ). Then we have
S(x∗, z∗)− S(xˆ, zˆ)
=
T∑
t=1
Lt(x
∗
t , z
∗
t , λ
∗)−
T∑
t=1
Lt(xˆt, zˆt, λˆ
?)
=
T∑
t=1
[
Lt(x
∗
t , z
∗
t , λ
∗)− Lt(x∗t , z∗t , λˆt)
]
+
T∑
t=1
[
Lt(x
∗
t , z
∗
t , λˆt)− Lt(xˆt, zˆt, λˆ?)
]
,
≤
T∑
t=1
[
Lt(x
∗
t , z
∗
t , λ
∗)− Lt(x∗t , z∗t , λˆt)
]
+
T∑
t=1
[
Lt(xˆt, zˆt, λˆt)− Lt(xˆt, zˆt, λˆ?)
]
.
(68)
Furthermore, for notation simplicity, we define G(λˆ) and
H(λˆ) as follows:
G(λˆ) ,
T∑
t=1
[
Lt(x
∗
t , z
∗
t , λ
∗)− Lt(x∗t , z∗t , λˆt)
]
, (69)
H(λˆ) ,
T∑
t=1
[
Lt(xˆt, zˆt, λˆt)− Lt(xˆt, zˆt, λˆ?)
]
, (70)
and we have S(x∗, z∗)−S(xˆ, zˆ) = G(λˆ)+H(λˆ). Moreover,
combining the following Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 proves this
theorem.
Lemma 8. The shadow price sequence λˆ = {λˆt, t ∈ T }
generated by strategy A in Algorithm 1 satisfies
H(λˆ) ≤ pi
2
2
1
ηT
+ Ξ2
T∑
t=1
ηt
2
. (71)
Proof Lemma 8. We prove this lemma by showing an upper
bound of the defined H(λˆ). According to the definition of
L(·), we have
Lt(xˆt, zˆt, λˆt)−Lt(xˆt, zˆt, λˆ?) =
(
Q
T − h˜t(xˆt, zˆt)
)(
λˆt − λˆ?
)
.
(72)
Furthermore, the projection operation in Algorithm 1
indicates the following inequality(
λˆt+1 − λˆ?
)2
=
[
P[0,pi]
(
λˆt − ηt
(
Q
T − h˜t(xˆt, zˆt)
))
− λˆ?
]2
≤
[
λˆt − ηt
(
Q
T − h˜t(xˆt, zˆt)
)
− λˆ?
]2
=
(
λˆt − λˆ?
)2
+ η2t
(
Q
T − h˜t(xˆt, zˆt)
)2
− 2ηt
(
λˆt − λˆ?
) · (QT − h˜t(xˆt, zˆt)),
(73)
which implies that(
λˆt − λˆ?
) · (QT − h˜t(xˆt, zˆt)) ≤ (λˆt−λˆ?)2−(λˆt+1−λˆ?)22ηt
+ ηt2
(
Q
T − h˜t(xˆt, zˆt)
)2
.
(74)
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Combining (72) and (74), we obtain
Lt(xˆt, zˆt, λˆt)− Lt(xˆt, zˆt, λˆ?) ≤ (λˆt−λˆ
?)
2−(λˆt+1−λˆ?)2
2ηt
+ 12ηt
(
Q
T − h˜t(xˆt, zˆt)
)2
.
(75)
Moreover, summing (75) from t = 1 to T leads to
T∑
t=1
Lt(xˆt, zˆt, λˆt)− Lt(xˆt, zˆt, λˆ?)
≤
T∑
t=1
(λˆt − λˆ?)2 − (λˆt+1 − λˆ?)2
2ηt
+
ηt
2
(
Q
T
− h˜t(xˆt, zˆt)
)2
≤
T∑
t=1
(λˆt − λˆ?)2
2
(
1
ηt
− 1
ηt−1
)
+
T∑
t=1
ηt
2
(
Q
T
− h˜t(xˆt, zˆt)
)2
≤pi
2
2
T∑
t=1
(
1
ηt
− 1
ηt−1
)
+ Ξ2
T∑
t=1
ηt
2
≤pi
2
2
1
ηT
+ Ξ2
T∑
t=1
ηt
2
,
(76)
where Ξ is defined in Definition 1. This completes the proof
of this lemma.
Lemma 9. The shadow price sequence λ˜ = {λ˜t, t ∈ T }
generated by strategy A in Algorithm 1 satisfies
G(λ˜) ≤ ΞΨ
T∑
t=1
ηt. (77)
Proof of Lemma 9. We prove this lemma by showing an
upper bound for G(λˆ). According to the definition of Lt(·),
we have
G(λˆ) =
T∑
t=1
Lt(x
∗
t , z
∗
t , λ
∗)− Lt(x∗t , z∗t , λˆt)
=
T∑
t=1
(
λˆt − λ∗
)(
h˜t(x
∗
t , z
∗
t )−
Q
T
)
= −
T∑
t=1
λˆtlt − λ∗
T∑
t=1
−lt
= −
T∑
t=1
λˆtlt − pi
[
T∑
t=1
−lt
]+
.
(78)
where lt is defined in Definition 2.
Note that the shadow price sequence λˆ generated by
Algorithm 1 satisfies the following inequalities
|λˆt − λˆt+1| ≤ Ξηt, ∀t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T − 1}. (79)
Hence we can derive an upper bound for G(λˆ) by
maximizing it over λˆ = (λˆt, t ∈ T ) under the inequality
constraints (79). That is, we have G(λˆ) ≤ Gˆ, where Gˆ is
defined by
Gˆ , arg max −
T∑
t=1
λtlt − pi
[
T∑
t=1
−lt
]+
s.t. |λt − λt+1| ≤ Ξηt, ∀t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T − 1},
var. λ = {λt, 1 ≤ t ≤ T}.
(80)
For notation simplicity, we define ∆ ∈ R(T−1)×T as follows
∆i,j =

1, if i = j,
− 1, if i+ 1 = j,
0, otherwise.
(81)
and introduce a set of auxiliary variables s ∈ RT−1.
Gˆ , arg max −
T∑
t=1
λtlt − pi
[
T∑
t=1
−lt
]+
s.t. |st| ≤ Ξηt, ∀t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T − 1},
s = ∆λ,
var. λ = {λt, 1 ≤ t ≤ T}, s = {st, 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1}.
(82)
We express the Lagrangian as follows:
L(λ, s;µ,ν)
=−
T∑
t=1
λtlt − pi
[
T∑
t=1
−lt
]+
+ µ>(s−∆λ)
+
T−1∑
t=1
νt (Ξηt − |st|)
(83)
Moreover, the duality theory implies that
Gˆ ≤ min
µ,ν
max
λ,s
L(λ, s;µ,ν). (84)
We maximize L(λ, s;µ,ν) over λ and s, and obtain
L(λ∗, s∗,µ,ν)
=

− pi
[
T∑
t=1
−lt
]+
+ pi
T∑
t=1
[−lt − (∆>µ)t]+
+
T−1∑
t=1
νtηtΞ, if νt ≥ |µt|, ∀t,
+∞, otherwise.
(85)
Then we minimize L(λ∗, s∗,µ, ν) over ν and obtain
L(λ∗, s∗,µ,ν∗)
=− pi
[
T∑
t=1
−lt
]+
+ pi
T∑
t=1
[−lt − (∆>µ)t]+
+
T−1∑
t=1
|µt|ηtΞ.
(86)
Now we know that the following inequality holds
Gˆ ≤ L(λ∗, s∗,µ, ν∗), ∀µ. (87)
Hence we define µ? ∈ RT−1 as follows:
µ?t = l¯
∗t−
t∑
k=1
lk, ∀ t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T − 1}, (88)
and obtain
T∑
t=1
[
−lt −
(
∆>µ?
)
t
]+
=
T∑
t=1
[−lt − (l¯ − r∗t )]+
=
T∑
t=1
[−l¯]+
= T
[−l¯]+ = [ T∑
t=1
−lt
]+
.
(89)
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Therefore, L(λ∗, s∗,µ?, ν∗) is given by
L(λ∗, s∗,µ?, ν∗) =
T−1∑
t=1
|µ?t |ηtΞ ≤ Ξ
T∑
t=1
ψtηt ≤ ΞΨ
T∑
t=1
ηt.
(90)
This completes the proof of this lemma.
APPENDIX C
Proof of Lemma 6. Recall that V ?ESP is the optimal revenue
under fixed pricing in hindsight. We let popt ∈ R denote the
corresponding optimal price. That is,
popt , arg max
p≥pmin
T∑
t=1
N∑
n=1
p · cn,t · x∗n,t(p) · y∗n,t(p). (91)
According to the definition of the discrete price candidates,
we suppose that popt satisfies
p(κ) ≤ popt ≤ p(κ+ 1). (92)
Therefore, we have
VESP(κ) = p(κ) ·
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
cn,tz
∗
n,t
(
p(κ)
)
(93a)
=
p(κ+ 1)
1 + 
·
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
cn,tz
∗
n,t
(
p(κ)
)
(93b)
≥ p(κ+ 1)
1 + 
·
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
cn,tz
∗
n,t
(
popt
)
(93c)
≥ popt
1 + 
·
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
cn,tz
∗
n,t
(
popt
)
(93d)
=
V ?ESP
1 + 
, (93e)
where (93c) is due to p(κ) ≤ popt. This completes the proof
of this lemma.
Proof of Lemma 7. We let Ωt ,
∑K
k=1 ωt(k) denote the total
weight in slot t.
The remaining proof consists of three parts.
Part I: Derive for ln(ΩT+1)−ln(Ω1) an upper bound that
is related to
∑K
k=1 Vt(k,κt).
According to weight updating in (46), we have
Ωt+1
Ωt
=
K∑
k=1
ωt+1(k)
Ωt
=
K∑
k=1
ωt(k)
Ωt
· (1 + δ)Vˆt(k,κt)
≤
K∑
k=1
ωt(k)
Ωt
·
[
1 + δ · Vˆt(k,κt)
]
,
(94)
where the last inequality follows Vˆt(k,κt) ≤ 1 (shown in
Proposition 2) together with the fact that (1 + δ)x ≤ 1 + δx
holds for any x ∈ [0, 1].
Moreover, the definition of ht(k) implies that we can
express ωt(k)Ωt as follows:
ωt(k)
Ωt
=
ht(k)− γ(1 + )k/P
1− γ , (95)
where P ,∑Ki=1(1 + )i is a constant.
Combining (94) and (95), we obtain
Ωt+1
Ωt
≤
K∑
k=1
ht(k)− γ(1 + )k/P
1− γ ·
[
1 + δ · Vˆt(k,κt)
]
= 1 +
K∑
k=1
ht(k)− γ(1 + )k/P
1− γ · δ · Vˆt(k,κt)
≤ 1 + δ
1− γ
K∑
k=1
ht(k) · Vˆt(k,κt)
≤ 1 + γδ
(1− γ)Nc¯pminP
K∑
k=1
Vt(k,κt).
(96)
We take the logarithmic operation of (96) on both sides, and
obtain
ln(Ωt+1)− ln(Ωt) ≤ ln
(
1 +
γδ
∑K
k=1 Vt(k,κt)
(1− γ)Nc¯pminP
)
≤ γδ
(1− γ)Nc¯pminP
K∑
k=1
Vt(k,κt),
(97)
where the second inequality follows that ln(1 + x) ≤ x for
any x ≥ 0. We then sum over t = 1 to t = T and obtain the
desired upper bound in Part I as follows:
ln(ΩT+1)− ln(K) ≤ γδ
(1− γ)Nc¯pminP
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
Vt(k,κt).
(98)
Part II: Derive for ln(ΩT+1)− ln(Ω1) a lower bound that
is related to
∑T
t=1 Vˆt(k,κt).
Now we derive for ln(ΩT+1) − ln(K) a lower bound
based on the definition of Ωt. Specifically, for any k ∈ K the
following holds
ln(ΩT+1)− ln(K) ≥ ln (ωT+1(k))− ln(K), (99a)
= ln
(
(1 + δ)
∑T
t=1 Vˆt(k,κt)
)
− ln(K),
(99b)
=
(
T∑
t=1
Vˆt(k,κt)
)
ln(1 + δ)− ln(K),
(99c)
≥
(
T∑
t=1
Vˆt(k,κt)
)(
δ − δ
2
2
)
− ln(K),
(99d)
where the last inequality follows that x− x22 ≤ ln(1 +x) for
any x ≥ 0.
Part III:
Combine the two inequities derived in Part I and Part
III, we know that the following is true
T∑
t=1
Vˆt(k,κt) ·
(
δ − δ
2
2
)
− ln(K) ≤
γδ
(1− γ)Nc¯pminP
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
Vt(k,κt), ∀κ ∈ K.
(100)
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We take the expectation of (100) over all the random
variables [κ1,κ2, ...,κT ], and obtain
E
[
T∑
t=1
Vˆt(k,κt)
]
·
(
δ − δ
2
2
)
− ln(K) ≤
γδ
(1− γ)Nc¯pminP E
[
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
Vt(k,κt)
]
, ∀κ ∈ K.
(101)
Mathematically, we note that
E
[∑T
t=1
∑K
k=1 Vt(k,κt)
]
= E [VESP(P)] . (102)
Moreover, we have
E
[
T∑
t=1
Vˆt(k,κt)
]
=
γ
Nc¯pminP
T∑
t=1
E
[∑
n∈N Vt,n(κt,n)I(κt,n = k)
ht(k)
]
=
γ
Nc¯pminP
T∑
t=1
[∑
n∈N Vt,n(k)
ht(k)
· ht(k)
]
=
γ
Nc¯pminP
T∑
t=1
N∑
n=1
Vt,n(k)
=
γ
Nc¯pminP VESP(k).
(103)
Substituting the above two expectation results into (101), we
know that the following inequality holds
E [VESP(P)] ≥
(1− γ)
(
1− δ
2
)
VESP(k)−Nc¯pminP 1− γ
γδ
ln(K), ∀k ∈ K.
(104)
Accordingly, the remaining proof is to show that Φ(, δ, γ)
is the upper bound of the loss term, as following
Nc¯pminP 1− γ
γδ
ln(K)
=
1− γ
γδ
·Nc¯pmin · [(1 + )
K − 1](1 + )

· ln(K)
<
1− γ
γδ
·Nc¯ · pmin(1 + )
K(1 + )

· ln(K)
=
1− γ
γ
· 1 + 

· NE¯c¯
δ
· ln (K)
≤1− γ
γ
· 1 + 

· NE¯c¯
δ
· ln
(
ln
(
E¯/pmin
)
ln(1 + )
)
= Φ(, δ, γ),
(105)
which completes the proof.
Proposition 2. Given the sequence κt generated in Algorithm 2,
we have
Vˆt(k,κt) ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ K, t ∈ T . (106)
Proof of Proposition 2. We prove this lemma by showing
the upper bound of Vˆt(k,κt). According to the definition of
Vˆt(k,κt) in (45), we have
Vˆt(k,κt) =
Vt(k,κt)
Nc¯pmin
· γ
ht(k)
∑K
i=1(1 + )
i
(107a)
≤ Vt(k,κt)
Nc¯pmin
· γ
γ·(1+)k∑K
i=1(1+)
i ·
∑K
i=1(1 + )
i
(107b)
=
Vt(k,κt)
Nc¯pmin
· 1
(1 + )k
(107c)
≤ pmin(1 + )
kNc¯
Nc¯pmin
· 1
(1 + )k
= 1, (107d)
where (107b) is due to the fact ht(k) ≥ γ·(1+)
k∑K
i=1(1+)
i , and
(107d) follows Vt(k,κt) ≤ pmin(1 + )kNc¯.
This completes the proof of this proposition.
Proof of Corollary 1. We prove this corollary based on
Theorem 3 under the inequality condition V ?ESP ≥ 8α ·
Φ
(
α
3 ,
α
6 ,
α
12
)
for some α ∈ (0, 1].
Theorem 3 under the parameters (, δ, γ) =
(
α
3 ,
α
6 ,
α
12
)
indicates
E
[
V TESP(P)
]
≥ (1−
α
12 )
(
1− α12
)
1 + α3
V ?ESP − Φ
(α
3
,
α
6
,
α
12
)
≥ (1−
α
12 )
2
1 + α3
V ?ESP −
α
8
V ?ESP
=
(1− α12 )2 −
(
1 + α3
)
α
8
1 + α3
V ?ESP.
(108)
Note that we have
(1− α12 )2 −
(
1 + α3
)
α
8
1 + α3
>
(
1− α6
)− (1 + α3 ) α8
1 + α3
(109a)
=
1− 7α+α224
1 + α3
(109b)
≥ 1−
α
3
1 + α3
(109c)
>
1
1 + α
, (109d)
where (109c) follows that 7α+α
2
24 ≤ α3 for any α ∈ (0, 1]. And
(109d) follows that 1+α/31−α/3 ≤ 1 + α holds for any α ∈ (0, 1].
This completes the proof of this corollary.
APPENDIX D
DIFFERENT UTILITY AND COST FUNCTIONS
This section extend the numerical results in Section 7
by taking into account different utility and cost functions.
Specifically, Section 7 focuses on α = 0.5 and β = 1 given
the series of utility u(x) = x
1−α
1−α and the cost e(s) =
s1+β
1+β ,
respectively. This section further considers the case of α =
0.6 and β = 2. Fig. 6 plots the utility and cost functions. It
is obvious that the concaveness or convexness is different.
Given the parameters α = 0.6 and β = 2, we will
compare the MU’s monthly payoff in the following three
cases:
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Fig. 6: Different utility and cost functions
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Fig. 7: MU monthly payoff
• The case of Opt corresponds to the off-line optimal
outcome discussed in Theorem 1.
• The case of Alg1 corresponds to the proposed online
strategy A defined in Algorithm 1.
• The case of Greedy corresponds to the greedy strategy
that tends to maximize the daily payoff without taking
into account the potential future over usage.
Fig. 7 plots the MU’s monthly payoff under different
monthly data caps. Comparing Fig. 7 with Fig. 2(b), we note
that the MU’s monthly payoff increases, but the relative
performance among the three cases is similar. This also
verifies the theoretical result for the MU’s online strategy.
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Fig. 8: ESP’s average revenue versus maximal raw data r¯.
Fig. 8 plots the performance of the pricing policy P
under different values of the maximal raw data amount
r¯. We compare ESP’s revenue under the pricing policy P
(labeled by Alg2) with the offline optimal revenue (labeled
by Opt). Comparing Fig. 8(a) with Fig 4(a), we note that
the ESP’s revenues of the two cases decrease. However,
comparing Fig. 8(b) to Fig. 4(b), we note that the relative
performance of the pricing policy is robust.
